La epistemología comparada y su impacto sobre la historiografía de la psicología

Abstract

“Comparative Epistemology” was first proposed by Ludwick Fleck in the 1930´s; some decades later the “new philosophy of science” recovered it and developed its implications for epistemological analysis of the scientific change. In contrast with the dogmatic view about truth, evidence, proof, objectivity and rationality, Fleck introduced an original idea on “thought styles” whose existence would underlie every belief socially and historically. In this paper I attempt to Christiansen, M Revista Electrónica Nova Scientia, Nº 2 Vol. 1 (1), 2009. ISSN 2007 - 0705. pp: 117 - 129 - 119 - explore the potential of Fleck´s approach when it is applied to the historiography of the psychology, particularly to the contemporary transition from the science of character (“Ethology”) to the science of personality. Such a case-study follows the research line of previous writings I have done about Nineteenth Century mental philosophy in England. In my opinion, this kind of work shows adequately the weaknesses of accumulationist and whiggish orthodox historiography of psychology, which has naively understood that transformation in terms of a mere “universal epistemic progress”. Instead, a non-prescriptivist historiographic model focuses on how a specific theoretical view has been born, accepted, validated and ultimately naturalized.